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A B S T R A C T
Formal Analysis of Concepts (FCA) is a method of data analysis that helps to study the relationship between a set
of objects and a set of attributes (the formal context). FCA not only allows detecting data groups (concepts) and
their graphical visualization, but also extracting rules that could reveal the underlying structure of the analyzed
context. The main idea of this paper is to present the fundamentals of FCA and how it can be used in reliability
engineering problems. To this aim, examples in reliability engineering, from both the literature and authors’
experience, have been selected for analysis. Comments on the new insights provided by FCA are also highlighted.
Finally, the results from the examples selected show that other reliability areas could benefit from using an FCA-
based approach.
1. Introduction
The formal analysis of concepts (FCA) is a method of data analysis
that allows studying the relationship between a set of objects and a
particular set of attributes, which can reveal their structure [1]. FCA is a
branch of lattice theory that was proposed by Rudolf Wille in 1981 [2].
FCA starts with the relation between a set of objects and a set of at-
tributes, represented by a cross table. As a result of processing the input
data, FCA produces: 1) groups that represent "natural" concepts in terms
of the attributes of the data; and 2) a collection of implications that
describes a specific dependency that exists in the data.
FCA has been used in different areas like software mining [4], web
mining [5], web-documents browsing [6–7], text mining and linguistics
[8], medicine [5,9–10], biology [11], chemistry [12–15], ontology
engineering [16–18], psychological data [19], functional magnetic re-
sonance imaging (fMRI) scans [20], sentiments analysis [21,22], deci-
sion-making [23], complex systems [24–25], e-learning [26], in-
formation sciences [27], criminal trajectories [28], anomaly detection
[29], terrorist threat [30], breast cancer [31], image processing [32],
preference analysis [33], material research [34], vessel accidents [35],
among other applications (See [36–37] for a complete list of refer-
ences).
The main idea of this paper is to show the fundamentals of FCA and
how it can also be used in several reliability engineering problems. As it
will be presented, FCA allows the visualization, navigation, information
retrieval and interpretation of concepts and rules, in a natural way,
with no statistical assumption on data.
To motivate the discussion, consider two problems faced in the re-
liability engineering context (these examples will be discussed in detail
in the manuscript). The first is related to the analysis of the cut-sets in a
system composed of two-state components, a well-known approach to
analyze how the system could fail. Given an input table that describes
the relationship between the status of the components (operating or
failed) and the state of the system (failed), FCA allows directly an-
swering questions that a reader could pose such as: What components
belong to a specific state or a specific cut-set? What components define
a minimum cut-set? What is the relationship among cut-sets? What
components simultaneously belong to several cut-sets?
The second example is related to the definition of a set of protection
strategies that could be used on a set of malevolent attacking scenarios
on a system. In this case, starting again with an input table that de-
scribes which protection strategy could be used to defend the system
against a specific attack, FCA allows answering, for example: What
strategy could protect several attacks? What attacks do not have any
defined defense strategy? What attack has a single protection strategy?
What protection strategies safeguard the same set of attacks? What
protection strategies, employed for a specific attack, could also be used
for other attacks?
After processing the input data, FCA produces two results to manage
such questions:
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1) The first is a lattice in which the data are grouped into a collection of
“formal concepts”, that is, groups representing "natural" concepts in
terms of the attributes of the data. Such groups are further divided
using other attributes, and finally “arranged hierarchically by a
subconcept-superconcept relation” [3] (e.g., “cut-sets in a net-
work”). A detailed visualization of the relationship is also possible.
2) The second output of FCA is a collection of implications that de-
scribes a dependency that exists in the data, such as, "protection
strategies A or B, could be used in the case of an attack S1”.
As previously mentioned, FCA is an approach well-known in the
literature. As a reviewer mentioned, there is enough literature ex-
plaining FCA, and this paper does not present new insights concerning
the “mathematics” of FCA. However, the set of selected examples, both
found in the literature or based on the authors’ experience, will re-
present, in our opinion, the beginning of applications of FCA in the
reliability area. These examples range from simple problems to more
complicated situations and show the main features of the FCA-based
approach.
So, for the FCA practitioner, the presented cases represent new ex-
amples that enrich the FCA world. At the same time, for the reliability
practitioner's view, FCA could be the start of another effective tech-
nique to enhance a better understanding of different problems. For
these reasons, the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
summary of the most important concepts of FCA, with comments re-
garding the advantages and disadvantages. Section 3 is devoted to de-
veloping several applications and examples. Finally, Section 4 con-
cludes with the most important considerations of this novel data
analysis technique.
2. Introduction to formal concept analysis
FCA is a data analysis technique, introduced by Wille [2] that stu-
dies the hierarchical structures induced by a binary relation between a
pair of sets, namely subsets of objects and attributes. The main and
original idea is to mimic the conceptual thinking of the human being. In
this section, we describe some of its main characteristics (for further
details revise [38–39]).
As is customary in the FCA literature, the example to be developed
will be directly related to reliability engineering. For that purpose, the
selected “toy example” to illustrate the main concepts of FCA is related
to various modeling and analysis techniques used for assessing the re-
liability of communication networks, an important milestone presented
by Ahmad et al. [58].
2.1. Formal context, formal concepts and lattice concepts
FCA requires as input a “formal context” that is a data matrix where
rows correspond to objects and columns to attributes. The entries of the
matrix describe the relationship between objects and attributes. In
general, such relationship is represented by one (1) or zero (0) to reflect
the presence or the absence of the attribute for that object. In many
cases, it is normal to replace 1s by “X” and leave a blank space for 0s. It
is important to remark that such replacement has the advantage that
the elements of the data matrix cannot be confused with numbers.
Indeed, an “X” has the meaning of “an object has the attribute” or “the
attribute is realized by object…”.
Mathematically, a formal context (G, M, I) consists of a set G of
objects, a set M of attributes and a binary relation I ⊂ G x M. “g I m”
means: “object g has attribute m”. Table 1 shows the formal context
table selected to illustrate FCA: “a generic overview of the major re-
liability modeling and analysis techniques in the domain of commu-
nication networks” [58].
Rows in Table 1 represent the modeling techniques, while columns
are the attributes selected by Ahmad et al. [58] for characterizing each
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{Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs), Fault Tree (FT), Markov Chain
(MCh), Bayesian Networks (BN)}. The set of attributes is M={Success
domain (SD), Failure domain (FD), Top-down approach (TDA), Identi-
fication and prevention of failure (IPF), Large and complex systems
(LCS), Combinatorial problems (CP), Non-combinatorial problems
(NCP)}.
The seven attributes evaluate several aspects related to the ad-
vantages and limitations of the modeling techniques. For example,
some techniques, such as RDB, MCh and BN could be “utilized to
evaluate overall system reliability” (attribute “success domain”) while
FT “could mainly be used to model the failure relations among” com-
ponents in a system (attribute “failure domain”). However, MCh and BN
are “unable to handle large and complex systems due to its state-based
nature” (attribute “Large and complex systems”). But not all systems
can be modeled with combinations of series or parallel branches (RDB)
or logical gates (FT) (attribute “Non-combinatorial problems”). (For
example, “RDB I SD” means RDB is utilized “to evaluate overall system
reliability”).
Note that, in terms of graph theory, a formal context is a bigraph,
consisting of a set of object vertices G, a set of attribute vertices M, and
a set of edges set I ⊆ G × M which specifies a binary relation between
these two sets [41] (Each edge is adjacent to one object and one at-
tribute vertex). This means that results from FCA could be also applied
in analyzing networks. In this case, the formal context is the incidence
matrix of the graph [42].
In general, it is possible to define, in every formal context, a pair of
derivation operators or concept-forming operators [43]. The Type I
Derivation Operators ↑: 2G → 2M defines for every set A ⊂ G (i.e., a
selection of objects) based on the question: Which attributes from M are
common to all these objects? That is A′:= A↑:= {m ∈ M | g I m for all g
∈ A}. In other words, A↑ is just the set of all attributes shared by all
objects from A. For example, A={RDB, MCh}, A ⊂ G and A′={SD, CP}
is an example of the Type I operator as well as B={FT,BN} and B′=
{FD,TDA}.
The Type II derivation operator ↓: 2M → 2G defines for every set of
attributes B ⊂ M based on the question: Which objects have all the
attributes from B? That is B′:= B↓:= {g ∈ G | g I m for all m ∈ B}. In
other words, B↓ is the set of all objects sharing all attributes from B. For
example, consider B={CP,NCP}, B ⊂ M and B′={MCh,BN}, is an ex-
ample of the Type II operator.
It is possible to show some facts for the derivation operators [38-
39]. Let (G, M, I) be a formal context. Let A, A1, A2 ⊂ G sets of objects
and B, B1, B2 ⊂ G sets of attributes. Then:
1) A1 ⊂ A2 ⇒ A′2 ⊂ A′1
1′) B1 ⊂ B2 ⇒ B′2 ⊂ B′1
2) A ⊂ A′′
2′) B ⊂ B′′
3) A′ = A′′′
3′) B′ = B′′′
4) A ⊂ B′ ⇔ B ⊂ A′ ⇔ A x B ⊂ I
Note that a formal context expresses a relation between objects and
attributes. However, as indicated in [44], the goal is “to characterize a
subset of objects uniquely by a subset of properties and a subset of
properties uniquely characterized by a subset of objects”.
Let (G, M, I) be a formal context, where A ⊂ G and B ⊂ M. (A, B) is
a formal concept of (G, M, I), iff A′ = B and B′ = A. In other words:
(A,B) is a formal concept if and only if A has just objects sharing all
attributes from B and B has just attributes shared by all objects from A.
The set A is called the extent, and the set B is called the intent of the
formal concept (A, B).
The term “concept” is a central, technical term and has its origin in
philosophy. On the other side, “formal” means that a mathematical
description is used. Note that formal concepts correspond to maximal
bicliques of a bigraph [41].
For small formal contexts, it is easy to find formal concepts. Indeed,
a formal concept (A, B) corresponds to a filled rectangular sub-table
with a row set A and column set B. For example, for the formal context
shown in Table 1, ({MCh, BN}, {SD, FD, TDA, IPF, CP, NCP}) is a formal
concept. Note that the description of a formal concept allows a “sym-
metric view on objects and attributes” [44] because each one of the two
parts determines the other. In reliability terms, it provides a “re-
dundant” description.
At this point, it is possible to define a relation between formal
concepts. Indeed, formal concepts are naturally ordered using the re-
lation subconcept-superconcept, which is based on inclusion relation on
objects and attributes [38–39].
Formally, the subconcept-superconcept relation is defined as fol-
lows. Let (A1,B1) and (A2,B2) be formal concepts of (G,M,I). (A1,B1) is a
sub-concept of (A2,B2) (denoted as (A1, B1) ≤ (A2, B2)) iff ⇔ A1 ⊂ A2
(iff ⇔ B2 ⊂ B1). In this case (A2, B2) is a super-concept of (A1, B1). In
practical terms, (A1, B1) ≤ (A2, B2) means that the set A1 is more
specific than the set A2 in (A2,B2), because B1 requires more “has the
attribute” relations than B2. Note that ≤ is interpreted as the sub-
concept-superconcept ordering. The notion of ordering allows defining
two additional elements for every two formal concepts (A1,B1) and
(A2,B2) of a given formal context: their greatest common subconcept or
infimum and the least common superconcept or supremum:
Infimun (or meet): (A1,B1)∧ (A2,B2) =(A1∩A2, (B1∪B2) ″) and
Supremum (or join): (A1,B1) ⋁ (A2,B2) =(A1 ∪A2, (B1∩B2) ″)
The set of all formal concepts of (G, M, I) is called the concept lattice
(Galois lattice [38–40]) of the formal context (G, M, I) and is denoted
by B (G,M,I).
An important theorem [39] states that the concept lattice of a
formal context is a partially ordered set (poset), defined as: Let P be a set
and ≤ is a binary relation on P. A partially ordered set is a pair (P, ≤),
iff
x ≤ x (reflexive)
x ≤ y and x ≠ y ⇒ ¬ y ≤ x (antisymmetric)
x ≤ y and y ≤ z ⇒ x ≤ z (reflexive)
for all x, y, z ∈ P.
That means that the concept lattice can be graphically represented
by means of a special Hasse diagram (in the formalism of FCA it is
called line diagram). Indeed, a Hasse diagram is a representation
method of ordered sets that shows a hierarchy in the diagram [44].
Fig. 1 shows the graphical representation for the formal context in
Table 1. The lattice is generated using the ConExp tool [45] (Freely
available at URL: http://conexp.sourceforge.net/).
In this single-source, single-sink, labeled, directed acyclic graph
(DAG), every node (or vertex) represents one formal concept while
edges express the ordering of concepts. Two concepts are comparable if
there is a directed path between their corresponding vertices in the
DAG; otherwise, they are incomparable. As mentioned in [44], the
filled upper semicircle indicates that there is at least one attribute at-
tached to the corresponding concept, whereas the filled lower semi-
circle indicates the set object attached to the corresponding concept. In
this figure, the so-called reduced labeling is used. That means that at-
tributes are written only at the first node (concept) they appear in. This
convention is also applied for objects [46] Note that the reduced la-
beling does not lead to a loss of information [1].
In Fig. 1, we notice the presence of two main elements: 1) A top
concept (supremum of the lattice) whose extent includes all the objects
and whose intent includes all attributes predicable of all objects, that is,
the more general concept; 2) a bottom concept (infimum of the lattice)
whose intent includes all attributes and whose extent include all objects
C.M. Rocco, et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 202 (2020) 107002
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that share all attributes, i.e., the least general concept. In our example,
the upper node reflects that all the techniques considered
simultaneously have three out of seven attributes defined. Markov
Chain and Bayesian Networks are the only techniques that can re-
present both failure and success domains, while only RDB and FT could
be used for large and complex systems. Finally, the lower node re-
presents (Ø, G), where Ø is the null set: no technique simultaneously
shares all the attributes. Moving from top to bottom means considering
more specific concepts, while moving from bottom to top means con-
sidering more general concepts.
Note the “navigation” in the lattice allows extracting the full in-
formation with respect to the extent and the intent of every concept.
Indeed, starting at a vertex and moving upward, we find a set of at-
tributes of the covering concept. If we move downward, we find the
Fig. 1. Concept lattice representation of the formal context in Table 1.
Fig. 2. Extents and intents of a selected vertex based on Table 1. a) formal concept ({MCh, BN}, {SD, FD, TDA, IPF, CP, NCP}). b) Objects associated to the label
“Large and complex”. c) Intents and extent associated to MCh and BN. d) Elements associated to RDB.
Fig. 3. A five-component network.
C.M. Rocco, et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 202 (2020) 107002
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objects of the covered vertex.
For example, Fig. 2a highlights the elements that define one of the
formal concepts previously detected ({MCh, BN}, {SD, FD, TDA, IPF,
CP, NCP})
Fig. 2b shows the elements associated with the label “Large and
complex”. It means that “Large and Complex” is a property of the ex-
tents FT, RDB. The concept lattice also allows detecting all the intents of
a selected object. For example, Fig. 2c shows that MCh or BN has six
intents. Fig. 2d allows analyzing the lattice when RDB is selected.
2.2. Obtaining association rules [47]
From the previous section, it is clear that FCA allows two basic types
of knowledge: a cross table or the formal context (i.e., the relation
between objects and attributes), and the concept lattice (i.e., the set of
all concepts of the context (G, M, I), ordered by the subconcept-su-
perconcept relation ≤). However, in many cases, a third basic of
knowledge can be also derived: implications and partial implications
sets between the set of attributes. Dependencies or implications have
the “if-then” structure, that is, A → C, where A ⊆M, C ⊆ M and A ∩
C = ∅. A is the premise or antecedent and B is the consequent. The set
of implications between attributes can be directly derived from the
concept lattice. In fact, given A → C, if an object has the attributes of
the antecedent then it also contains the attributes of the consequent [1].
On the other side, partial implications [48] (also known as
“association rules” [49]) hold almost for all objects. In other words,
association rules do not apply to all their involved objects, and the
probability of relationship of one set of attributes with the other set of
attributes is less than 100%. [47].
Two indexes are used to characterize an association rule: support
and confidence. The support of A → C is defined as support (A →
C) = |(A ∪ C) | and measures “the number of objects that contain both
the attributes of premise and conclusion of the association rule” [1].
The confidence of the association rule A → C is defined as confidence
(A → C) =|(A ∪ C)|/ |A| and represents “which percentage of objects
that contain the premise of the association rule also contain the con-
clusion of the association rule” [1]. Note that while the support is a
measure of the frequency of a rule, the confidence is a measure of the
strength of the relationship between sets of items [49].
For example, if the Sup of a rule A⟹C is 20% and its Conf is 95%,
then the rule states that when A happens, there is a 95% probability of
having C and that A and C are expressed together in 20% of the cases. In
general, the user defines threshold values minimum_Sup and
minimum_Conf values, for selecting meaningful rules [50–52].
The ConExp tool [45] is used in this work to extract the implications
between properties, and the association rules. The ConExp tool shows
association rules as: “< x > Q =[%]=> 〈 y〉 R”, which can be read as
follows: “There are y objects having attribute R out of x objects having
attribute Q. Or, “% of the objects having Q have R” [15].
2.3. Discussion
Formal Concept Analysis is an important approach for knowledge
representation with applications in different areas. Starting from a
given a formal context it is possible to perform visualization, navigation
and information retrieval, and interpretation of concepts and rules. FCA
can simultaneously consider a different type of data, such as real
numbers, ordinal numbers, or nominal numbers. In general, many-va-
lued attributes could be easily converted using a scaling transformation
[39,63]. Note that no statistical assumption on data is required for
performing an FCA. This fact represents a clear advantage of other
statistical approaches (e.g., correlation or clustering analysis).
One of the main disadvantages of the presented approach is the fact
that FCA could derive a very large number of formal concepts, even if a
small formal context is used [54]. However, as mentioned in [53], the
worst-case complexity (O(2min(|G|,|M|)) “is rarely found in practice” and
special techniques of concept lattice reductions have been developed to
“produce a concept lattice isomorphic to the original” [54] and cope
with this characteristic (See [54,59] for a detailed analysis of the main
approaches for reduction). As previously mentioned, in the case of
multivalued tables, a transformation is necessary to obtain a suitable
context table, but with an increase of the cardinality of the attribute set
(examples of such transformations will be presented on the next sec-
tion). One way to cope with this fact is the use of fuzzy FCA approaches.
In these cases, fuzzy concept lattices are generated providing additional
information [65] (e.g., membership values of objects in each fuzzy
formal concept). However, in this paper, only crisp values will be
considered. The interested reader could check the works in [65–68].
In the next section, several examples related to the reliability do-
main illustrate how FCA is performed.
Table 2
Failed states associated with Fig. 3.
Component State
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13 e14 e15 e16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Fig. 4. Concept lattice diagram corresponding to the formal context of Table 2.
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3. Applications
In this section, four examples are analyzed using the FCA approach.
The examples, related to well-known reliability experiences, are used to
better understand the basic concepts of FCA and how the reliability area
could benefit. Some examples are based on real data, while others have
been adapted from the literature.
The first example describes the FCA approach based on the cut-sets
in systems modeled as networks. The second example uses notions
derived from the knowledge space theory [55] to analyze which pro-
tection strategy could be used to prevent different types of attack sce-
narios in a given network. The last two examples illustrate the exten-
sion of binary formal contexts to assess: a) failure events under different
causes (levels of granularity); and b) the importance of nodes in an
electric power system based on several measures of importance [56]
(attributes with multiple values).
3.1. Cut-sets in a network
A cut-set is a minimum set of branches of a connected graph, so that
when all of elements of the sets are removed from the graph, the graph
is separated into two distinct parts [57]. In reliability analysis, a cut-set
is defined as a set of components of a system which, when failed, causes
system failure. Among all of the cut-sets, reliability analysis seeks the
minimum cut set, that is any cut set which does not contain any other
cut set as a subset, and all components of a minimal cut set must fail to
cause system failure.
Fig. 3 shows a reliability block diagram of a network with five
components. It is easy to show that there are 4 minimum cut-sets: C1=
(1,2), C2 =(4,5), C3=(1,3,5) and C4=(2,3,4), where (x,y) is referred to
failed components x and y. The cardinality of each set defines its order.
For example, C3=(1,3,5) is a third-order minimum cut-set. Note that
high order minimum cut-sets do not include low-order minimum cut-
sets (e.g., C3 does include neither C1 nor C2).
To illustrate the FCA approach, let consider Table 2. This table
shows the 16 failed state ei of the system (The rest of the total 25=32
states correspond to operational states and are not shown). This table
will define the formal context of our example. Note that, as mentioned
in the previous section, the table describes the relationship between
components and the states of the system: if 1, then the failed component
Fig. 5. Extents and intents of a selected vertex that defines the four minimal cut-sets. a) Vertex e5: minimal cut C1=(1,2). b) Vertex e16: minimal cut C2 =(4,5). c)
Vertex e10: minimal cut C3=(1,3,5). d) Vertex e13: minimal cut C4=(2,3,4).
C.M. Rocco, et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 202 (2020) 107002
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belongs to a state; 0 otherwise. For example, in state e1, components 1,
2 and 3 are failed.
Fig. 4 shows the concept lattice corresponding to the formal context
of Table 2. The lattice shows all the relations among states and com-
ponents. Note that the upper node is not represented as an empty node,
as in the previous example. Indeed, it has associated the label e2
meaning that this node includes all the states (concepts) downwards
(remember that in state e2, all components are failed). On the other
side, the lower node is empty, meaning that there is no component that
simultaneously belongs to all states. The rest of the nodes with a label
mimic the concept of cut-sets, but only a few correspond to minimal
cut-sets.
Fig. 5 shows the extent and intents of selected nodes that define the
four minimal cut sets. For example, Fig. 4a shows both intents and
extents for the concept e5 that defines the minimal cut set C1=(1,2).
Indeed, concept e5 considers only components “failed” 1 and 2. The rest
of intents clearly contain e5 and thus, by definition, are not minimal cut
sets. A similar comment explains Fig. 4b: in this case, concept e16 de-
fines the minimum cut-set C2 = (4,5). The analysis of Fig. 5 im-
mediately suggests to the reader that the nodes labelled and with ex-
tents formed only by components are effectively minimal cut-sets. Note
that in this example, an implication is interpreted as “a given minimum
cut set ⟹ a cut set” or “a cut set is included in another cut set”. For
example: e5=(1,1,0,0,0) ⟹ e1=(1,1,1,0,0) ⟹ e3=(1,1,1,01).
The nodes with no label correspond to the union of components that
are needed to build the lattice but do not define a failed state. For
example, let us consider the intents and extents for the filled red vertex
in Fig. 6. Components 3 and 5 are the two extents. Note that there is no
state in Table 2 with only components 3 and 5 failed. A simple in-
spection of Fig. 3 shows that the system is operating when only com-
ponents 3 and 5 are failed. It is interesting to note, that one of the
intents associated with this red node is e15. This means that compo-
nents 3 and 5 are included in state e15. However, e15 is not a minimum
cut set since it includes the states e16 (see Fig. 5d).
The set of implications and rules derived by ConExp just refer to
evident implications that could also be derived directly from the pre-
vious figures (for example e10 ⟹ e3, see Fig. 5c). So FCA ends at this
point.
As mentioned in the introduction, FCA allows answering a set of
questions related to components, states and cut-sets. Of course, for the
example at hand, the questions posed are very easily answered even
with no FCA. But for complex systems, where many min-cut-sets are
derived, for example, using a Monte Carlo approach and some machine
learning approach, such questions could be very difficult to be an-
swered [69–71]. Finally, it is important to mention that the concept
lattice can highlight the relations of generalization and specialization
between attributes and objects.
3.2. Robust protection strategy on network under diverse attacks
In [60], the authors present a three-step approach for identifying a
set of a robust defense strategy against a set of possible attacks to a
network. Given a network and its performance function, and a set of
possible attacks, the approach: 1) solves a bi-objective formulation,
which minimizes system vulnerability (or, more specifically, maximizes
survivability) while minimizing cost; 2) produces Pareto-optimal fron-
tiers for each specific attack; and 3) makes use of a multi-criteria de-
cision-making technique to aggregate the attacks together to find a set
of common protection strategies, that is, a set of protection strategies
that could be used on a set of specific attacks.
To illustrate how FCA could be used in this context, let consider the
information presented in Table 3 (adapted from 61). In this case, the
formal context consists of 10 protection strategies - objects, which could
be used in 20 different attack scenarios - attributes.
Fig. 7a shows the corresponding concept lattice. From the concept
lattice graphical layout, it is evident that several protection strategies
could be used in many attack scenarios. However, there is no single
strategy to protect all the possible scenarios. It is important to realize
that strategy S2, could be only used in attack scenarios 5 and 6
(Fig. 7b). For this reason, the resulting concept lattice is asymmetric (a
dense left branch with protection strategies for many attack scenarios).
Also, note that attack scenario 5 could be only protected by strategy S2.
Thus, attack scenario 5 is the most difficult scenario to protect.
Note that protection strategies S8 and S9 (objects of formal concept
12) could be indifferently selected for the same scenarios, that is, they
have the same “values” for the attributes considered. In the FCA lit-
erature, objects that have the same set of attribute values are viewed as
Fig. 6. Extents and intents associated with the filled (red) vertex. (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
Table 3
Formal context for protection strategies and attack scenarios (modified from [61]).
Strategy Attack scenarios
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
S1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
S4 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
S5 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
S6 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
S7 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
S8 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
S9 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
S10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
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equivalent. Additionally, attributes possessed by the same set of objects
are considered as equivalent (e.g., scenarios 11 and 17). This fact means
that the original formal context could be reduced. ConExp allows per-
forming redundant information removal such as clarifying and redu-
cing. Of course, such actions on the input context are performed prior to
the beginning of analysis. For additional details on these procedures,
see [54].
Up to this point, the insightful reader may have noticed that the first
FCA result, mentioned in the introduction (that is, groups that represent
"natural" concepts) greatly facilitates the understanding of the in-
formation presented in Table 3, visualizing strategies and scenarios in a
clearer way as well as their relationships.
As previously mentioned, it is possible to derive a list of association
rules, i.e., a list of relational dependencies between attributes. By de-
fining a minimal support of 10% (one object) and minimal confidence
of 100% (only the clear implications between the attributes in the
formal context) we found 36 association rules.
Table 4 shows a list of 11 association rules with a minimal support
of at least 50% and confidence of 100%. For example, rule 1 has a
support of 70%, that is, it is true for seven different protection strate-
gies. It means that protection strategies (S3 to S9) used for attack sce-
nario 18 could be always used for attack scenarios 2 and 7.
Let assume that minimum_Sup= 6 and minimum_Conf =80%.
ConExp generates the following rules with 80%<Conf<100%:
< 8 > 7 =[88%]=> < 7 > 2 18;
< 8 > 2 =[88%]=> < 7 > 7 18;
< 7 > 2 7 18 =[86%]=> < 6 > 19;
< 7 > 2 7 18 =[86%]=> < 6 > 6 16;
< 7 > 6 =[86%]=> < 6 > 2 7 16 18;
For example, rule < 7 > 2 7 18 =[86%]=> < 6 > 19 states that
86% of the protection strategies that could be used for scenarios 2, 7
and 18 could be also used for scenario 19. Indeed, seven protection
strategies (S3 to S9) could be used for scenarios 2, 7 and 18. But only six
strategies (S4 to S9) could be used for scenario 19.
At this point, the second main role of the FCA, particularly the
finding of implications, should be clear. Indeed, if the user knows, a
priori, some implications, these could also be verified through a simple
analysis of the data table (the formal context). If there are implications
not known, the FCA is able to derive them.
Since the concept lattice is an acyclic directed graph, it is possible to
order the protection strategies with respect to the number of extents.
Fig. 8 shows the concept lattice generated using the transposed of the
formal context of Table 3. Fig. 8a shows which attack scenarios are
related to protection strategies while Fig. 8b shows the relations in term
of number and percentage of extents. For example, S2 has 2 extents
(attacks scenarios 5 and 6). Fig. 9b allows ordering the protection
strategies with respect to the number of extents. One of such ordering is
S2 – (S1 – S10) – S3 – S5 – (S7 – S8 – S9) – S6 – S4: strategies near the
top of the list could be used in fewer attack scenarios while strategies at
the end of the list cover many attacks scenarios (strategies in par-
enthesis have the same number of extents).
3.3. Formal concept analysis over attributes with levels of granularity
In many cases, the interpretation of a context table using FCA is not
satisfactory because the number of formal concepts derived is too small
for providing a clear understood. This problem is caused when the at-
tributes selected are too “simple” and concentrate a broad meaning,
that is, the set of attributes “does not provide a sufficiently fine gran-
ulation of the input objects”. That means that in order to have a more
precise reasoning, additional subdivisions related to the attribute under
study are included. For example, let suppose that C = {technical cause,
external cause}, represents the set of attributes related to the cause of
failures in an electric distribution system. For example, a technical
cause could be the erroneous opening of a circuit breaker while an
external cause could be a car accident affecting a pole and power lines.
In order to have a better understanding, the level of granularity is
increased (i.e., a finer granularity) by defining a granularity-level tree
(gl-tree): a rooted tree with additional attributes. For example, we can
divide the attribute external cause with attributes, weather-related and
Fig. 7. Concept lattice for Table 3. a) complete lattice. b) Scenarios protected by S2.
Table 4
Some implications derived from Table 3.
Implications Support%
1 18 ⟹ 2,7 70
2 2,7 ⟹ 18 70
3 16 ⟹ 2,6,7,18 60
4 6,18 ⟹ 2,7,16 60
5 2,6 ⟹ 7,16,18 60
6 6,7 ⟹ 2,16,18 60
7 19 ⟹ 2,7,18 60
8 11 ⟹ 2,6,7,16,17,18,19 50
9 17 ⟹ 2,6,7,11,16,17,18,19 50
10 16,19 ⟹ 2,6,7,11,17,18 50
11 6,19 ⟹ 2,7,11,16,17,18 50
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car-accidents causes.
To illustrate the usage of levels of granularity, the Electric
Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report (Form OE-417) is selected
[62]. This report “collects information on electric incidents and emer-
gencies in the USA. The Department of Energy uses the information to
fulfill overall national security and other energy emergency manage-
ment responsibilities, as well as for analytical purposes” [62]. From the
available data, a subset of 18 events of the disturbance report, related to
January 2018, for three regional electric reliability councils is selected
(a): The South Reliability Corporation (SERC); b) Texas Reliability
Entity (TRE); and c) Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)).
Table 5 shows the formal context used. Here the set of objects re-
presents events while the set of attributes represents the time (T) of the
events, the regional council affected (R), the causes (C), and if the event
causes load-shed (L). In the original report, there are two attributes to
characterize a load-shed: the amount of load interrupted, and the
amount of customer affected. Some events have an “unknown” label.
For these events, labels “unknown” and “0 customers affected” are
considered as no load-shed events.
Tree gl-trees are considered in this example: T={daytime, after-
noon}; R ={SERC, TRE, WECC}; C= {weather-related, technical, and
attack}.
For example, the first event happened in the afternoon, in the SERC
region, was caused by weather conditions, with no load disrupted.
Fig. 9 shows the lattice generated. Note that the option “Show object
count” is selected in ConExp: a count and the percentage of the total
objects are presented. It is interesting to realize that only 7 out of 18
events caused load-shed. In addition to examples of evident implica-
tions, like Attack => Loadshed, it is possible to detect more elaborated
examples. Indeed, Fig. 9 shows the implication WECC => Loadshed,
Afternoon. The list of implications detected by ConExp is:
1 < 4 > daytime Technical => SERC;
2 < 3 > afternoon loadshed => WECC;
3 < 3 > SERC loadshed => daytime;
4 < 3 > WECC => afternoon loadshed;
5 < 3 > Attack => loadshed;
6 < 2 > afternoon TRE => Weather;
7 < 1 > TRE loadshed => daytime Attack;
8 < 1 > Weather loadshed => daytime SERC;
Fig. 8. concept lattice derived from Table 4 transposed. a) complete lattice. b) complete lattice showing% of objects.
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9 < 1 > daytime Attack loadshed => TRE;
By using minimum_Sup= 6 and minimum_Conf =60%, ConExp derived
the following rules:
1 < 18 > {} =[61%]=> < 11 > SERC;
2 < 9 > daytime =[78%]=> < 7 > SERC;
3 < 11 > SERC =[64%]=> < 7 > daytime;
4 < 7 > Technical =[86%]=> < 6 > SERC;
5 < 8 > Weather =[62%]=> < 5 > SERC;
6 < 4 > daytime Technical =[100%]=> < 4 > SERC;
Fig. 9. concept lattice derived from the table.
Table 5
Formal context for failures events [62].
Time Region Causes
event daytime afternoon SERC TRE WECC Weather Technical Attack Load-shed
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
3 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
4 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
5 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
6 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
7 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
8 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
9 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
10 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
11 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
12 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
13 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
14 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
15 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
16 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
17 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
18 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
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7 < 6 > SERC Technical =[67%]=> < 4 > daytime;
This example could be easily extended to include additional attri-
butes with different types of data. For example, the duration of the
event (DE), an attribute reflecting conceptually a between relation, is
modeled as an inter-ordinal scale (e.g., DE ≤ 1; 1〈DE ≤ 3; DE〉3).
3.4. Formal concept analysis over attributes with multivalue [63]
Previous examples have considered only binary relations, that is, an
object has or has not an attribute. In many cases, the context table has
attributes in the form of multi-value ordinal type and can assume an
ordered range of scores. For example, Table 6 shows the partial in-
formation extracted from [63]. A set of five objects are evaluated using
two pollution indices (attributes) FC and CP: the higher the attribute
value the higher the pollution level. The observed values for FC and CP
are {1,2,3,4,5} and {0,3,5} respectively. It is clear that, for example,
object 27 shows the higher FC index, while object 31 shows the higher
values for CP.
Table 6 must be transformed in order to be used in FCA. The
transformation is called “scaling” [63]. As described in [39], the
transformation consists on “replacing every many-valued attribute by
the corresponding attribute-category pairs, with each object being de-
scribed by one attribute-category pair per many-valued attribute”. That
means that the context table is built-up as a Boolean matrix where each
attribute value occupies a column. Note that the lowest value of each
attribute is considered as the default one. For example, attribute FC is
converted to 4 attributes FC2, FC3, FC4 and FC5. Using this transfor-
mation, a value of “1″, say in column FC2, means that the corre-
sponding objects scored at least 2 for the FC attribute, i.e., the ordinal
property of attribute FC is conserved. Table 7 shows the final formal
context.
To illustrate this type of transformation, let us consider Table 8. In
this table, objects represent the nodes of the IEEE 30 test power system,
described as a network, and attributes represent the importance of each
node, measured through different indexes (High values of indicators
mean less importance of a node) [56]. For example, node 6 is con-
sidered the most important node using attributes AC, Pagerank, NWR,
Degree and Betweenness.
Note that each attribute ranges from 1 to a maximum value of 30
(the number of nodes in the system). Since a complete transformation
would require a very high number of additional columns (i.e., a high
granularity) a simpler version that properly illustrates the approach is
considered. As previously mentioned, additional approaches, based on
fuzzy techniques, have been used to tackle this problem. However,
here, only the classical transformation is presented.
Each attribute will be transformed using two alternatives based on
the values from Table 8. For example, the two categories, High and
Medium represent the rank of each node for each attribute considered.
In this way, category High (H) is defined for nodes ranked between the
Table 6








Formal context for Table 6.
ID FC2 FC3 FC4 FC5 CP3 CP5
1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 0 0 1 0
27 1 1 1 1 0 0
31 1 1 1 0 1 1
Table 8
Rank of node importance for the IEEE 30 power system [56].
Node_ID AC_rank DC_rank Reliability_rank Pagerank_rank NWRank_rank Degree Betweenness_rank
1 28 26 16 22 24 23 21
2 4 2 8 6 7 5 10
3 22 23 24 23 22 21 20
4 14 13 14 7 3 4 3
5 26 27 21 24 25 22 22
6 1 14 3 1 1 1 1
7 7 3 19 25 16 15 19
8 2 1 26 27 18 13 23
9 29 29 5 10 9 8 13
10 9 10 2 2 2 2 2
11 30 30 28 29 29 29 23
12 6 5 7 3 4 3 4
13 12 28 22 30 28 28 23
14 19 15 25 21 20 16 23
15 15 9 6 5 8 6 8
16 21 16 20 18 17 19 18
17 10 11 17 20 15 17 15
18 24 17 10 14 19 26 16
19 13 8 15 13 23 27 16
20 20 19 11 17 13 18 14
21 8 4 23 26 21 14 23
22 17 20 9 11 11 10 11
23 18 18 12 19 14 20 12
24 11 12 13 9 10 11 7
25 25 22 4 8 12 12 9
26 23 21 30 28 30 30 23
27 5 6 1 4 5 7 5
28 3 25 18 12 6 9 6
29 27 24 27 15 26 25 23
30 16 7 29 16 27 24 23
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first and the fifth position while category Medium (M) is for nodes
ranked between sixth and 10th. Note that each node that scores a high
rank in a specific attribute also scores the corresponding medium rank.
The same reasoning applies to nodes that rank medium: they also rank
better than the default score (i.e., rank better than 11th). In this way,
the ordinal property of attributes is conserved.
Fig. 10a shows the concept lattice (59 concepts derived) for the
corresponding multi-valued data. The bottom node is empty, indicating
that there is no dominant node (i.e., no node rank better in all attri-
butes). The set of objects at the lowest level {10, 6, 12, 27, 2} could be
considered as the most important nodes in the network, according to
the importance measures selected. On the other side, the set of objects
at the highest level includes the least important nodes: none of these
nodes scores on the defined scales (H or M).
At first glance, the analysis of the lattice shows trivial implications.
For example, Fig. 10b shows the relationship between AC_rankH and
AC_rankM. This trivial relationship is a direct consequence of setting
the multi-valued context table (Table 9). The same behavior is observed
in Fig. 11c, among DC_rankH and DC_rankM.
A more interesting relationship is presented in Fig. 10d. The se-
lected concept Pg_rankH is related to six attributes, including the trivial
implication with Pg_rankM. Also note that among the extents, there are
4 of the 5 most important nodes of the network: the set {6,10,12,27}.
This set is also derived when the concept {B_rankH,NW_rankH} is se-
lected. From Fig. 10a some equivalent attributes or objects are also
detected, such as B_rankH and NW_rankH as well as nodes 7 and 21. It is
Fig. 10. Concept lattice for the IEEE 30 ranking example. a) complete lattice. b) extents for AC_rankH. c) extents for DC_rankH. d) extents for Pg_rankH.
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important to realize that this analysis is valid for the network con-
sidered. Other networks could produce different conclusions [64].
An additional fact that could be derived from the concept lattice is
the presence of partial ordering among nodes. For example, in Fig. 10a,
node 2 is more important than node 8. Additional chains could be de-
rived.
By using minimum_Sup= 10 and minimum_Conf =80%, ConExp
derived the following rules:
1 < 10 > B_rankM =[90%]=> < 9 > NW_rankM;
2 < 10 > B_rankM =[90%]=> < 9 > Pg_rankM;
3 < 10 > D_rankM =[90%]=> < 9 > NW_rankM;
4 < 10 > NW_rankM =[90%]=> < 9 > B_rankM;
5 < 10 > NW_rankM =[90%]=> < 9 > D_rankM;
6 < 10 > NW_rankM =[90%]=> < 9 > Pg_rankM;
7 < 10 > Pg_rankM =[90%]=> < 9 > B_rankM;
8 < 8 > Pg_rankM D_rankM =[100%]=> < 8 > NW_rankM;
9 < 8 > D_rankM B_rankM =[100%]=> < 8 > NW_rankM;
10 < 9 > NW_rankM B_rankM =[89%]=> < 8 > D_rankM;
11 < 9 > NW_rankM B_rankM =[89%]=> < 8 > Pg_rankM;
12 < 9 > NW_rankM D_rankM =[89%]=> < 8 > Pg_rankM;
13 < 10 > R_rankM =[80%]=> < 8 > D_rankM;
Fig. 11a shows a reduced concept lattice with the relationship among
the attributes for the set of the most important nodes. Figs. 11b and 11c
show the concepts required to define the set of the most important
nodes (at least for the IEEE 30 case).
4. Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to introduce Formal Concept Analysis to the
reliability practitioner and to show how the approach is easily applied
in some situations that could exist in the reliability field. However, both
areas of knowledge benefit from the applications presented.
FCA is a mathematical method for data analysis with emphasis on
structure, relations and visualizations. FCA only requires an input
context table (objects, attributes and binary relation details). As a re-
sult, FCA produces a clear graphical output of the data structure (formal
concepts and order relations) and derives a set of implications and as-
sociation rules (possibly hidden dependencies in the data). Both outputs
would allow a better understanding of the data.
The results of the four examples analyzed by FCA confirm once
again that the approach provides an effective way to analyze a set of
data. For the reader familiar with FCA, it is certainly not a new fact.
However, for the reliability practitioner, there are several aspects to
highlight. First, the representation of data through a lattice turns out to
be a tool of high utility and understanding. Indeed, objects and attri-
butes can be viewed and related directly. For example, knowing im-
mediately which components (objects) belong simultaneously to more
than one cut-set is useful for maintenance purposes (example 3.1). Or,
being able to quickly detect that there is only one valid protection
strategy for an attack scenario, allows the decision-maker to define
alternative protection schemes for a proper redundant system (example
3.2). Or, knowing the set of the most and the least important nodes in a
network (example 3.4) could suggest a convenient restructuration in
the network. Second, FCA allows detecting implications not known by
the user. For example, in example 3.3, the occurrence of an event in the
afternoon causes loadshed in a region. This fact could require additional
insights from the operator of the system.
FCA analyzes situations in which it is possible to define a binary
relation between a set of objects and a set of attributes. This is the case,
for example, of fault diagnosis assessment, in which, for a certain event,
the components involved are detailed. Of course, other applications
could benefit from using an FCA-based approach, such as threat as-
sessment, community detection in networks, software reliability,
among others: only a formal context table is required.
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